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ABSTRACT 
Since Saddam Hussein took power in 1979, Iraq was 
engaged in wars with Iran, Kuwait, and twice with the United 
States.  The years between the wars with the United States, 
1991-2003 were characterized by economic sanctions that 
destroyed the social fabric the wars had missed.  In 2003, 
after major combat operations were complete, the United 
Nations created the United Nations Assist Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI) to prop up the nation in hopes of returning it to a 
self-sustaining country capable of managing itself 
economically and politically.   
This thesis assesses the success of the UNAMI based on 
two metrics relating to effectiveness and efficiency.  The 
first metric hinges on stated objectives compared to goals 
achieved and the second will examine the three primary human 
development indicators; life expectancy at birth, adult 
literacy, and GDP per capita.  The purpose is to determine 
if the method by which a project is measured determines its 
effectiveness and efficiency.  After reviewing the UNAMI and 
applying two measures of effectiveness and efficiency, the 
assessment is the mission is only partially effective and 
all aspects are inefficient.     
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On May 2, 2003, the President of the United States, 
George W. Bush, announced to the world on the USS ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN (CVN-72) that major combat operations were over in 
Iraq.1  While most assumed that the announcement would be 
followed by troop withdrawals and subsequent peace in the 
region, as of this writing, multinational force troops are 
still on the ground in Iraq.   When Saddam was deposed, a 
power vacuum emerged, and deep-seated anger from the 
repressed Shiite majority surfaced. Lawlessness followed; in 
major cities, widespread looting and destruction were 
directed at museums, markets, and public infrastructure such 
as oil and electrical sites. 2  The destruction of national 
sites may have robbed Iraq of its historical narrative; 
however, the destruction of the infrastructure of oil 
producing industry, which produced ninety-five percent of 
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), deprived the 
Iraqis of the economic resources to start anew.3   
The United Nations (UN) recognized the severe 
humanitarian crisis years of war had created for the Iraqis, 
and adopted a series of resolutions to help manage the 
situation. Once the United Nations Assist Mission for Iraq 
                     
1 CNN, “Bush Calls End to 'Major Combat',” CNN March 3, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/01/sprj.irq.main/ (accessed 
August 20, 2008).  
2 Robert McMahon, “Iraq: In Aid Appeal, UN Officials Cite Looting, 
Leadership Vacuum,” Global Security, (June 2003). 
3 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book: Economy Iraq, 
(2007). 
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(UNAMI) was adopted, follow-on resolutions created a 
strategic framework to partner nations around the world with 
the interim and permanent government of Iraq during 
reconstruction.  The immediate focus was the development of 
governance to allow Iraq to manage its political and 
economic future.  Progress in governance appeared swift, as 
power shifted from the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) 
to an Iraq Interim Government (IIG) in 2004, just eleven 
months after Saddam Hussein was deposed.4  Progress in other 
sectors of reconstruction did not move forward as originally 
expected.  The lack of progress was attributed to the 
deteriorating security environment created as Sunni and 
Shiite militias battled for power.  As the multinational 
forces exercised greater control over assigned areas, the 
militias turned their hostilities for each other against the 
occupying forces.   
In January 2007, a troop surge was implemented to 
counter the growing violence in Iraq. 5  By mid-2007, 
violence had started to decrease, providing an opportunity 
for the Iraqi government to implement policies to stabilize 
the country.  The improved security situation provided 
                     
4 The Coalition Provincial Authority, “An Historic View of Coalition 
Provincial Authority Accomplishments 2003-2004,” http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/ (accessed August 22, 2008). 
5 By January 2007, 3,065 U.S. military personnel had lost their lives 
in Iraq.  Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Brookings 
Institute, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables to Reconstruction and Security 
in Post-Saddam Iraq, (January 29, 2007), 6-20. 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20070129.pdf (accessed 
August 23, 2008); As of July 2008, the U.S. death toll was at 4,125. 
Twelve of those lives were lost in July 2008, which was the lowest 
casualty rate on record since the beginning of the Iraq war.   Michael 
E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Brookings Institute, Iraq Index: 
Tracking Variables to Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, 
(July 31, 2008), 6-19.  
http://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/
index20080731.pdf (accessed August 23, 2008).    
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optimism for Iraq and the primary stakeholders of the UNAMI, 
prompting the UN to adopt follow-on resolutions to increase 
its interactive and proactive role with Iraq while promoting 
humanitarian assistance.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
How well the United Nations manages Iraq’s transition 
and facilitates its successful reconstruction campaign may 
ultimately define its future role in Peace Support 
Operations (PSO).  Many people have been highly critical of 
the UN’s handling of PSOs over the years.  Those most 
critical, characterize its practices as ineffective due to 
“lack of accountability to donors, inability to manage its 
people, insufficient transparency and accountability.” 6 
While Kofi Annan insisted that UN processes had become “more 
transparent, accountable, and responsive” during his tenure, 
he acknowledged, “our work is far from complete.” 7  The 
United Nations, like any large international organization, 
can always improve it efficiency and effectiveness. From 
1948 to 1988, the UN conducted fifteen peacekeeping 
operations; some of these are still ongoing.  Since the end 
of the Cold War, the UN has undertaken forty-seven missions, 
with the most significant increase in troop deployment was 
between 2000 to 2006 reaching a total of 380,000 personnel.8  
                     
6 Becky Tinsley, “The UN is Inefficient, Wasteful, Self-serving and 
Plain Corrupt,” UK Limited (2005). 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4159/is_20050918/ai_n15352157/pr
int?tag=artBody;col1. (accessed August 25, 2008);  Brett D. Schaefer, 
“United Nations” The Heritage Foundation, (2006).   
7 United Nations, Sixty-First General Assembly Plenary. “General 
Assembly Pays Tribute to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Administers Oath 
of Office to Successor Ban Ki-Moon,” (December 14, 2006).  
8
 Marjorie Ann Browne, CRS Report for Congress: United Nations 
Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, (August 21, 2007), 6. 
 4
The UN historically executes operations with a get in and 
get out mentality, leaving a recently recovered state 
susceptible to a series of failures, as occurred in Sierra 
Leone and Somalia. 9   The UN cannot turn back the clock; 
however, it can adopt practices that foster sustainability 
in recipient nations.   
A review of UNAMI’s existing gauge of progress in 
transformation and reconstruction may provide some insight 
into its degree of success.  Currently, measurements of 
progress are reported in dollars spent in producing 
education centers, health facilities, and increases in 
electricity rather than significant outcomes like literacy 
rates and increased life expectancy.  Reporting progress in 
terms of dollars spent raises significant concerns regarding 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission.   
C. DETERMINING EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The United Nations routinely cites its efficient and 
effective execution of mandates and work in peace support 
operations.10  But those within the General Assembly, and 
representatives from many nations, have raised concerns over 
alleged mismanagement and fraud in recent years. 
Representatives from South Korea, New Zealand, Vietnam, and 
Finland stated that the volume and complexity of UN PSOs 
require “strengthening internal control in order to enhance 
 
                     
9 UN official website, “List of Operations,” 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf (accessed August 24, 2008).  
10 The IRFFI WB/ITF sites effectiveness 60 times in the 60 page 
document. The World Bank, International Reconstruction Fund Facility for 




transparency and accountability,” with the need to 
“streamline and simplify procurement procedures taking into 
account best practices.”11   
The one area critics and supporters can both agree on 
is that the UNAMI focuses on dollars spent in a particular 
area of reconstruction as a measure of progress.  According 
to Cohen, one of the challenges to stabilization and 
reconstruction (S/R) is that “progress is judged on the 
basis of programs that have been implemented rather than on 
actual results.” 12 He argues this measure of progress is 
detrimental to achieving stated objectives and results in 
excessive spending.  The crux of the argument lies in the 
effectiveness and efficiency in which the mission is 
administered.  Each side has differing views of the 
efficiency and/or effectiveness of the mission in Iraq.  
Civil-military relations scholar Thomas Bruneau 
distills a useful characterization of efficiency and 
effectiveness from theorists in physics, economics, and 
organizational theory. He succinctly defines efficiency as 
“cost-effectiveness” or the “most efficient use of 
resources:” in layman’s terms, “more bang for the buck.” 13  
The efficiency piece of any mission is difficult to measure, 
                     
11
 United Nations Sixty-first General Assembly, Fifth Committee 
Meeting, Enhanced Transparency, Strengthened Accountability Needed, As 
United Nations Procurement Grows In Size, Complexity, Budget Committee 
Told (October 23, 2006).  
12
 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and 
Reconstruction”, United States Institute of Peace: Stabilization and 
Reconstruction series (March 2006), 2-4. 
13
 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matei, “Towards a New 
Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” 
Democratization 15 no.5 (2008): 909-929.  
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particularly in the absence of tangible data such as levels 
of education or the capability of security forces.  Dr. 
Bruneau defines effectiveness as “fulfilling roles and 
missions,” or simply “the ability to actually achieve stated 
goals.”14 Downs and Stedman argue that estimating 
effectiveness is measuring success and it should be measured 
by “developing one or more outcome indicators, each of which 
measures the extent to which a goal that is considered 
central to the operation’s success has been achieved.”15  
Efficiency and effectiveness are the means through which a 
mission is achieved.  They have little to do with its 
success, but everything to do with the way the mission is 
perceived.  
D. WHAT DOES SUCCESS LOOK LIKE? 
To accurately measure the success of a mission, a 
number of preconditions should be agreed to before it 
commences. Haphazardly throwing resources at a mission is a 
waste of time.  Some basic considerations include 
determining what success looks like, establishing a plan to 
support the vision of success, and taking into consideration 
political support and the will of the people to provide 
troops and resources. The timing of the dispatch of troops 
and resources is as important as the plan itself. Peace is a 
precondition for reconstruction missions, meaning financial 
resources will be squandered or abused if injected prior to 
                     
14 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matei, “Towards a New 
Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” 
Democratization 15 no.5 (2008): 909-929. 
15 George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002), 44-45.   
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peace.  Conversely, if a country lacks the capacity to 
absorb resources, as occurred during the first years of 
Iraq’s reconstruction, resources will not be used and remain 
in an account.  Another essential ingredient for success is 
the presence of troops who will establish and keep the 
peace. 
This thesis will apply two metrics to the UNAMI.  The 
first will review the initial and follow-on UNAMI mandates, 
and compare the UNAMI’s accomplishments with its objectives.  
The areas of review will be agriculture, education, and 
health: areas with considerable transparency relative to 
other areas.  The second metric will compare human 
development indicators in 2000 and again in 2007, before and 
after the UNAMI was instituted.  The human development 
indicators are adult literacy, GDP per capita, and life 
expectancy.  The progress in each cluster area will be 
assessed as to its effectiveness and its efficiency based on 
the reported achievements within the clusters.   
E. THE UNITED NATIONS ASSIST MISSION FOR IRAQ(UNAMI): 
SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
Since the inception of the UNAMI, many have questioned 
its ability to succeed.  Those most critical of the UNAMI 
say it is ineffective, and they are quick to point out the 
enormous amount of money the mission consumes without 
producing tangible progress. One issue is the way in which 
the UNAMI reports progress in dollars spent rather than 
objectives achieved.   Supporters of the mission argue that 
the UNAMI is making progress and should be viewed in a 
broader sense that cannot be measured in the current 
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setting, but rather must be viewed over time as Iraq’s 
infrastructure, educational system, economic situation, and 
governance improve.   
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 
1500 and 1546 concerning Iraq, which were adopted in 2004, 
were ambiguous and open to interpretation.  Stedman 
paraphrases, Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr 
points of view that, “multidimensional peacekeeping missions 
are complex with many unknown variables and fall victim to 
mission creep once a peacekeeping force enters a country.” 16 
This ambiguity allows the mandate to remain flexible and 
makes it difficult to qualify the mission as a failure or 
success.  This is particularly troublesome in light of 
criticism that peacekeeping missions are ineffective.   
As the UN’s capacity developed with the UNAMI, it 
adopted a larger role in the country.  UNSCR 1770, adopted 
in 2007, provided greater detail on the scope of the UN’s 
mission in Iraq than did the resolutions passed in 2004.  
The additional resolution gave greater responsibility in the 
reconstruction effort with an emphasis on humanitarian 
assistance through capacity and development programs.       
1. Critics of UNAMI 
A recent Congressional Research Service study examines 
the reconstruction effort in Iraq and the lack of progress 
from 2003 through 2006.  While this is not a complete list, 
the following provides a broad flavor of the issues that are 
hampering progress.  Those issues include:  1) Poor 
                     
16 George Stedman and Stephen John Stedman, Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002), 46.   
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accountability - a number of projects were badly executed 
and the resources misused; 2) ineffective assistance - 
objectives were not met in oil production and electrical 
power generation; 3) inadequate levels of assistance - 
excessive spending on security to conduct reconstruction 
projects created increased overhead costs; and 4) broadly 
dispersed assistance - the aid attempted to do too much, 
spanning across the country in areas from health to 
electricity.17  A more focused approach in specific 
locations emphasizing a few initiatives would have provided 
greater tangible success than broadly dispersed 
reconstruction.   
The list provides an overview of the problems hindering 
progress in Iraq’s reconstruction; however, it fails to 
succinctly identify the causes of delay.  Given the amount 
of information that was available to Congress in order for 
it to produce this report, it is surprising that the causes 
of delay were not identified. 
David Walker and Anthony Cordesman are two primary 
critics of the spending practices of the UNAMI.  Walker, the 
Comptroller General of the United States, cites three 
distinct reasons for ineffectiveness in the reconstruction 
of Iraq: 1) lack of well-defined requirements, 2) inadequate 
oversight and accountability, and 3) that progress was 
hindered by “multiple agencies pursuing individual efforts 
without overarching direction.” 18   Walker states, “The 
United States is entering its fifth year of efforts to 
                     
17 Curt Tarnoff, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, CRS Report for 
Congress (January 17, 2008), 38-40. 
18 David M. Walker, Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing and 
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability 
over U.S. Efforts and Investments (March 11, 2008), 1.  
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rebuild and stabilize Iraq, but these efforts have neither 
consistently achieved their desired outcomes nor done so in 
an economic and efficient manner.”19 
Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, has been equally as critical of the 
lack of efficiency in rebuilding Iraq.  Cordesman has 
produced a series of documents that analyze the Department 
of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) status 
reports on Iraq, citing the “inability to account for aid 
spending in detail, or measure the effectiveness of aid 
projects with any accuracy.” 20  GAO and CRS reports dating 
back to 2003 identify the cause of ineffectiveness in Iraq; 
however, practices remain unchanged, resulting in lessons 
documented not lessons learned.  While the UN has no ties to 
the Departments of Defense and State, it still must maintain 
a level of transparency comparable to them in order to 
maintain legitimacy. The primary thrust of Cordesman’s 
critique is that the UN is funded and supported by the 
member nations it represents, and therefore, reporting 
should be up to Western standards.  
2. Supporters of UNAMI 
The UN makes claims about the success of the UNAMI 
through a variety of monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports 
that chronicle its achievements.  While the UN concedes that 
the mission is not successful in all areas, the list of 
achievements is considerable.  According to the United 
                     
19 David M. Walker, Government Accountability Office, Stabilizing and 
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability 
over U.S. Efforts and Investments (March 11, 2008), 2.  
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Reconstruction in Iraq: The Uncertain Way Ahead (January 19, 
2007), 4. 
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Nations Development Group Iraq Transition Fund (UNDG/ITF) 
semi-annual reports from 2004 to December 2007, $1.3 billion 
was deposited into the ITF, of which $1.08 billion were 
approved for contracts.  To date, 56 out of 141 projects 
were approved, and eight are operationally closed and 
complete.21  The UNAMI successes include providing 
assistance with drafting the Iraqi Constitution, organizing 
two rounds of general elections, and assisting in delivering 
social services comprised of health care, education, water 
and sanitation, and employment.22   
Cluster A, consisting of Agriculture, Food Security, 
Environment, and Natural resource management, approved 
funding in the amount of $157.67 million; Of which, $117 
million was received and expended at a rate of 74 percent. 23  
The approved funding was used to provide safe drinking water 
to 15,000 residents in six communities. 24 Six of Iraq’s nine 
water-pumping stations were rehabilitated, providing 
irrigation water for four major provinces. 25 Over 11,000 
acres were cleared, increasing the availability of land for 
agriculture and grazing.   
                     
21 United Nations Report to Donors, Seventh Six-Month Progress Report 
on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Development Group 
Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) of the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (May 1, 2008), iii.  
22
 Ibid., 6.  
23
 Ibid., 63. 
24
 Ibid., 6. 
25 United Nations Report to Donors, Sixth Six-Month Progress Report 
on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Development Group 
Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) of the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (October 19, 2007), 4. 
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Other developments include capacity building projects, 
through which 460 senior policy staff were trained in areas 
of environmental, veterinary, and water management in order 
to increase future development.26  
Cluster B, consisting of education and culture approved 
funding in the amount of $191 million; of which, $150.9 
million was received and expended at a rate of 79 percent. 27  
Cluster B accomplishments include rehabilitation of 433 
primary schools and reconstruction of an additional 244, 28 
procurement and distribution of “nine million textbooks 
benefitting six million students,” 29 and the establishment 
of “17 vocational institutes and equipping 52 others, 
development of one National Literacy Resource Center, and 
rehabilitation of seven technical colleges.”30  
Cluster D, consisting of health and nutrition, approved 
funding in the amount of $155 million, of which $117 million 
was received and expended at a rate of 75 percent. 31 Cluster 
D accomplishments include “improvement in sector 
legislation, strategies, and policies to support health 
reform process” and “reducing the prevalence of communicable 
disease.”32  Infant mortality rates and children under-five 
rates have been reduced by 50 percent since 1999. In 
addition, nearly 25 percent of the population now has access 
                     
26 United Nations Report to Donors, Seventh Six-month Progress Report 
on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Development Group 
Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) of the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (May 1, 2008), 6. 
27 Ibid., 6.  
28 Ibid., iv. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 63. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., v. 
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to improved healthcare services such as hospitals, maternity 
units, mental health facilities and training centers.33  
The list of accomplishments in each cluster area 
appears modest based on the considerable funding attached to 
each area.  The latest UNDG report identified lack of 
security and indecision by the Iraqi government as the two 
recurring factors that have limited progress.   
F. CONCLUSION 
This thesis will review the United Nations Assist 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) with a focus on UN-adopted mandates 
that address the reconstruction of Iraq.  By understanding 
the sequence of events leading up to the development of 
UNAMI, it is easier to understand the challenges the mission 
faces today.  A brief history of Iraq will be followed by a 
synopsis of the development of the UNAMI, to include 
associated mandates, organizational structure, and progress 
since inception.  Once primary achievements are outlined, an 
assessment of three cluster areas will utilize the two 
metrics identified above to determine if the method by which 
a project is measured determines its success.  
 The thesis will compare the stated objectives of the 
UN mandates with the achievements of UNAMI as published by 
the UN.  By measuring the results in the specific cluster 
areas against widely-accepted gauges of effectiveness and 
efficacy based on an input-output model, one can determine 
if a mission is meeting its intent.  The same cluster areas 
were measured against human development indicators (HDI) 
                     
33 United Nations Report to Donors, Seventh Six-month Progress Report 
on Activities Implemented under the United Nations Development Group 
Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) of the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) (May 1, 2008), v. 
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defined by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).  The 
HDIs are life expectancy at birth, literacy rates, and the 
standard of living or GDP per capita.  The achievements are 
compared against each model to establish if the method by 
which a project is measured determines its success relative 
to effectiveness and efficiency.  
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II. IRAQ: FOUR DECADES OF MISSTEPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s was a time of unprecedented economic success 
for Iraq, in large part due to the nationalization of the 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1972, and its subsequent 50 
percent increase in oil production within two years.  This 
move appeared fortuitous in light of the oil price spike in 
1973 and 1974, when prices increased by over $7 per barrel 
in less than two years. 34  The significant increase in 
Iraq’s oil revenue paved the way for infrastructure 
expansion and military modernization projects.  Iraq’s 
economic boom expanded to every level of society; for the 
first time in Iraq’s modern history, a middle class 
developed.35  The economic good fortune would be short-
lived, falling victim to political missteps that led to an 
eight year war with Iran, followed by thirteen years of 
sanctions and two wars with the United States that left the 
country occupied.   
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1968, Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, a leading member of the 
Baath party, ascended to the presidency of Iraq after a 
successful coup that removed President Abdul Rahman Arif.  A 
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principal constituent in the takeover was Al-Bakr’s cousin, 
Saddam Hussein.  Hussein was appointed vice chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), making him second in 
command.36  Over the course of the next decade, Hussein 
instituted a series of changes that consolidated most of the 
power and wealth in the country to a few of his closest 
allies.  
In 1973, a failed coup attempt led to constitutional 
changes that provided even greater power to the President.  
In 1974, the RCC became the body responsible for making 
official policy, exercising both executive and legislative 
power in the country. 37 During the same period, an 
initiative to purge all formidable opponents was undertaken; 
as a result, Al-Bakr’s Baath party dominated the political 
landscape, with his family members appointed to primary 
seats in the government.    
By the mid-1970s Al-Bakr’s health was failing and he 
grew dependent on his second in command, Saddam Hussein. As 
power slowly shifted to Hussein, Al-Bakr’s presence in 
internal and external political matters faded.  By 1976, 
Saddam Hussein was de facto president of Iraq; however, this 
did not become official until 1979.   
C. SADDAM HUSSEIN ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY 
On July 16, 1979, Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr 
resigned, and Saddam Hussein officially replaced him as 
president of the republic and commander in chief of the 
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armed forces. 38  In a foreshadowing of events to come, 
Saddam Hussein called the RCC to a meeting in Baghdad on 
July 22, 1979, and identified sixty-eight men as co-
conspirators in a coup plot to overthrow his presidency.  
Hussein ordered the public execution of twenty-one of the 
identified conspirators.  Over the course of the next few 
weeks, hundreds were executed for their role or knowledge of 
the coup plot.39  
As the 1970s ended, Iraq had been politically and 
economically transformed.  Politically, it had survived a 
series of failed coup attempts, and the Baath party had 
maintained a strong hold on resources.  Economically, the 
country was going through a period of unprecedented growth.  
In 1972, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was nationalized 
and the following year oil prices exploded. 40  From 1973 to 
1975, Iraq’s oil revenue leaped from $1 billion to $8 
billion.41 This rapid increase in revenue spurred the 
development of infrastructure in every major sector, 
including social services, production of goods, and 
expansion and modernization of the military.42  
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D. IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
In 1980, Iraq reported oil revenues exceeding $26 
billion.  The expectation was for further economic 
prosperity as modernization projects continued in Iraq. The 
political landscape, however, began to change.  In 1979, 
Iranian influence helped transform Iraq’s repressed Shiite 
population into an organized faction led by Baqir Al Sadr 
against the Baath party with principal differences of betwwn 
the two factions were religious points of view. 43  A series 
of Iranian-backed protests by Shiite Iraqis further 
increased tensions between Iran and the Baathist party.  In 
the spring of 1980, Sadr launched failed assassination 
attempts against Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Azizi and 
Minister of Culture Latif Nayyif Jasim, which prompted 
immediate action by Iraq. 44 Members of the Iraqi Shia with 
ties to Iran were deported to Iran, and Saddam Hussein 
ordered the execution of Al-Sadr and his sister. 45 The 1975 
Algiers Accord, which had temporarily resolved a long 
history of disputed territory and navigational waterways 
between Iraq and Iran, was abrogated. A series of border 
disputes led to an exchange of artillery fire and, by 
September 1980, Iraqi troops had marched into Iranian 
territory to begin eight years of war.46  
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Within days after hostilities commenced, the oil-
exporting capabilities of both countries were attacked and 
crippled, including “loading facilities, pumping stations, 
refineries, terminals and pipelines.” 47  The damage reduced 
output to a fraction of its prewar levels. To illuminate the 
devastation and put oil production capacity into context, 
“output declined from 3.4 million barrels per day (b/d) in 
August to a mere 140,000 b/d in October.” 48  The excessive 
damage to petroleum infrastructure forced supply trains to 
be rerouted, which reduced revenue due to increase shipping 
costs and further multiplied the economic impact.  Prior to 
the war, Iraq’s GNP had been $39.7 billion; however, one 
year into the conflict, its GNP had been reduced to $30.1 
billion.49   
By 1981, Iraq’s oil revenue had been slashed by 60 
percent, deeply impacting the country’s Gross National 
Product (GNP) and leading to an increase in foreign 
borrowing. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided Iraq with $2 
billion per month through the first few years of the war, 
allowing Iraq to finance the war with Iran while continually 
modernizing its army and infrastructure.   
There was a significant drain of the labor force during 
the years leading up to and throughout the Iran-Iraq war.  
It was estimated that two-fifths of the labor force was 
employed by the agriculture market.  In 1978, the armed 
forces were approximately 140,000 strong; by 1982, they had 
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increased to 450,000. 50  Since such a large segment of the 
Iraqi population had been farmers, the increase in the armed 
forces left a void in agricultural production.  Wheat 
production dropped from two million to 163,000 tons per year 
by 1984, and rice production dropped from 965,000 to 95,000 
tons per year in the same time.51  
While agriculture was not the primary source of revenue 
for the central government, the reduction in agricultural 
revenue was significant when coupled with the loss in oil 
production and the increase in foreign debt.  These three 
variables had a negative impact on Iraq’s economy, forcing 
the country to change spending practices.  
Iraq’s economic situation worsened in April 1982, when 
Syria closed an Iraqi pipeline that flowed through their 
territory.  The pipeline was responsible for transporting 
400,000 b/d, or roughly $5 billion in revenue per year. 52  
Syria’s action reduced Iraq’s oil exporting capacity to 
approximately one-fourth its prewar level.  
By the mid-1980s Iraq had spent $94 billion on the war 
effort.53  Iraq secured all foreign aid support to third 
world countries, restricted foreign travel, and non-military 
imports were reduced from $16.8 billion to $6.6 billion.  
Due to Iraq’s volatile condition, the Organization of Arab 
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Oil Exporting Countries (OAPEC) reduced Iraq’s market share 
from $26.1 billion in 1980 to $8.4 billion in 1983.54   
E. EFFECTS OF WAR 
On August 20, 1988, the Iran-Iraq war ended.  The war 
had left both countries in ruins and produced little change 
in the political or geographic landscape of the region. 
While there was no clear winner in the eight-year conflict, 
both sides suffered heavy losses in blood and treasure.  The 
true toll of war would be measured beyond the dead; “experts 
believed in 1988 that these hardships…would gradually erode 
what social cohesion and progress had been achieved over the 
previous decade….” 55  The war cost Iraq an estimated one 
million casualties, nearly $500 billion in lost oil revenue 
and infrastructure damage, and great GNP losses. 56  Iran’s 
losses exceeded those of Iraq.  Using comparative variables 
of damaged infrastructure, lost oil revenue, and GNP, the 
economic impact for Iran was $644.3 billion and one million 
casualties.57  
During the course of the war, the UN passed nine 
resolutions.  The first of these, UNSCR 479, acknowledged 
the situation between the warring parties, calling on them 
to “…refrain immediately from a ny further use of force.” 58   
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Both sides ignored this resolution and continued with 
escalatory force against one another with each passing year. 
Reports that Iraq was using chemical weapons against 
Iranians surfaced as early as 1983.  On February 24, 1986, 
the United Nations passed security council resolution 582 
calling for an “immediate cease-fire, cessation of all 
hostilities on land, at sea and in the air and withdrawal of 
all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries 
without delay.” 59 UNSCR 582 recognized the atrocities 
against non-combatants in point two, stating that,  
[The international community] deplores the 
escalation of the conflict, especially 
territorial incursions, the bombing of purely 
civilian centers, attacks on neutral shipping or 
civilian aircraft, the violation of international 
humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict 
and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons 
contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol.60  
Two more years of war would rage before the cessation 
of hostilities.  By 1988, Saddam Hussein had used chemical 
weapons (CW) on Iranians in ten confirmed incidents. 61  With 
no punitive action from the UN for his use of CW, Saddam 
turned his lethal weapons on internal threats, reportedly 
killing 8,000 to 24,000 Kurds from 1983 to 1988.62  
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Following the war, Iraq’s infrastructure and economy 
were fractured, war debt from foreign borrowing had 
marginalized the dinar, inflation was rampant, and the Kurds 
to the north were rebelling.   Saddam Hussein sought to 
replenish the resources that years of war had depleted.  
Iraq was heavily in debt to Kuwait as a result of the Iran-
Iraq war.  A land dispute in the resource-rich region fueled 
tensions between the two nations.  Kuwait was the richest 
country in the region, creating a target of opportunity for 
Saddam. 
F. PRELUDE TO THE GULF WAR AND THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME 
On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s army crossed into 
Kuwait and overthrew the government. The United Nations 
responded with UNSCR 660, condemning Iraq’s actions and 
demanding an immediate withdrawal.  After four days of Iraqi 
non-compliance with resolution 660, the UN adopted UNSCR 
661, which directed all states to prevent the import or 
export of all commodities from Iraq or Kuwait, with the only 
exceptions being medicine and foodstuffs in a humanitarian 
crisis.  The resolution went on to state that no state shall 
receive or provide commercial, industrial or public utility, 
economic or financial resources to or from Iraq or Kuwait. 63 
Over the course of the next three months, eleven resolutions 
were passed against Iraq, setting additional restrictions on 
the two countries. 64  The impact of the resolutions had an 
exponential effect on Iraq’s industry, leading to further 
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declines in the economy.  As the majority of Iraq’s economy 
was tied to oil, the oil embargo created the largest long-
term impact on the economy.  The blockade caused an 
immediate impact on food supplies since 70 to 80 percent of 
Iraqi food was imported. 65  As food became scarce, the 
prices dramatically spiked; in some cases, food prices 
increased 1800 percent.66   
On November 29, 1990, UNSCR 678 demanded that Iraq 
withdraw from Kuwait.  If Iraq failed to comply with UNSC 
678, the UN would use all necessary means to uphold and 
enforce Resolution 660. 67  Saddam once again defied the UN.  
Therefore, on January 17, 1991, the United States executed a 
series of surgical strikes on military targets in Iraq and 
Kuwait.68  The initial plan included eight-four targets.  
However, by the time operations were underway, the target 
set had grown to 400; by the time operation desert shield 
was over, 723 sites had been destroyed. 69  Air strikes on 
civilian infrastructure, power stations, transport and 
telecommunications networks, fertilizer plants, oil 
facilities, industrial plants and civilian buildings 
destroyed nearly all critical infrastructures.  Repairing 
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the damaged infrastructures were slow and nearly impossible 
due to lack of available materials created by the UN 
embargo.70  In a relatively short period, the Iraqi army was 
marginalized.  A UN special mission to Iraq noted that, 
“Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-
industrial age, but with the disabilities of post-industrial 
dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.”71 
Following Operation Desert Storm, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 687, creating a comprehensive set of restrictions 
that banned the research and development of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and deliver systems.  The resolution 
required the implementation of a WMD monitoring program to 
verify resolution compliance. It also included the 
establishment of a compensation fund financed by Iraq to 
settle war claims.  Iraq’s failure to comply with the 
declarations in UNSCR 687 became the justification for 
limited U.S. air strikes over the next decade. 
G. OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM 
In 1991, reports about the grave humanitarian crisis in 
Iraq continued.  The United Nations took action to address 
this crisis by proposing UN Resolutions 706 and 712.  The 
resolutions allowed Iraq to sell up to $1.6 billion worth of 
oil for six months to “mitigate deteriorating human 
conditions.”72 The Oil-for-Food program stipulated that 30 
percent of the revenue generated should be earmarked for the 
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compensation fund and payment of UN transaction costs; Iraq 
was left with roughly $1.3 billion to finance the import of 
food, medical, and essential humanitarian goods for 18 
million Iraqis.  The Iraqi government refused to accept the 
terms of the resolutions and the humanitarian crisis 
continued. 
In 1995, the UN revisited the Oil-for-Food resolution 
to address the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.  The same 
provisions as those contained in UN Resolution 706 were 
provided in UN Resolution 986, along with authorization to 
sell $2 billion worth of oil. 73  Iraq again rejected the 
terms of the resolution, due to the UN’s insistence on 
controlling the funds.  Finally, in 1996, Iraq accepted the 
terms of the new resolution.   
Over the course of the next few years, the Oil-for-Food 
program continued to grow, generating greater revenue for 
Iraq in its attempt to meet its humanitarian needs. By 1998, 
over $5 billion was authorized under the Oil-for-Food 
program; however, Iraq had only achieved roughly $3.8 
billion in oil sales.74  The program generated $64.2 billion 
throughout its life, yet humanitarian needs had not been met 
when the Oil-for-Food program ended in 2003. 75  The 
expectation was that the Oil-for-Food program would 
alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.  However, infant 
mortality rates continued to increase, reaching 150/1,000, 
                     
73
 UN Security Council Resolution 706, S/RES/706, (August 15, 1991); 
UN Security Council Resolution 986, S/RES/986, (April 14, 1995).  
74
 Approximately 97 percent of the revenue from the Oil-for-Food 
program was earmarked for humanitarian relief during this time.   
75
 Briefing Paper on the UN OFF Program, “Independent Inquiry 
Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program” (October 21, 
2004), 6. 
 27
or 4,475 deaths a month; by 1996, nearly half a million 
deaths due to malnutrition had occurred.  The continued loss 
of life throughout the Oil-for-Food era indicated that two 
sets of sanctions were in place: one imposed by the UN, and 
another imposed by Saddam Hussein, who withheld resources 
from the Iraqi people.76   
H. SADDAM’S DEFIANCE 
During this same period of time, Saddam continued to 
defy UN Resolution 687 by not allowing the UN weapons 
inspection teams unfettered access to all sites throughout 
Iraq.  The United Nations Special Commission UNSCOM, charged 
with inspecting Iraq’s suspected chemical and biological 
weapons making capabilities, drafted a series of letters to 
the UN, outlining the challenges imposed by the Iraqi 
government on the inspection teams. 77  Throughout UNSCOM’s 
mission, the Iraqi government would periodically ban them 
from travel, refused to authorize inspections to 
predetermined sites, and disrupt or halt disarmament work. 78   
Three additional resolutions were adopted demanding Iraq’s 
cooperation with UNSCOM inspection teams; however, Iraq 
waffled on its cooperation and ignored resolutions.  
Finally, all inspections were halted, and UNSCOM was told to 
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leave the country on November 13, 1997. 79 On December 17, 
1999 the United Nations adopted UNSCR 1284, which 
established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC would take on the 
same responsibilities as UNSCOM had been given in UNSCR 687; 
however, it would be three years before a team was assembled 
and functional.  
On November 8, 2002, UNSCR 1441 was adopted, recalling 
nine prior resolutions adopted by the UN and accepted by 
Iraq with the expectation of compliance.  By 2002, Iraq had 
stalled weapons inspection teams for nearly three years. 
Resolution 1441 “warned Iraq that it will face serious 
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its 
obligations [to allow unfettered access to weapons 
inspection teams]. 80 UNSCR 1441 would serve as the final 
warning, and provide ammunition for U.S.-led military action 
against Iraq a few months later.  
I. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
On March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush addressed 
the nation. He called on Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 
forty-eight hours or face military action. The President 
said, 
the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. 
We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in 
the United Nations Security Council.  
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We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to 
oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith 
has not been returned.81   
The U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.  
U.S. Forces met light resistance, and within six weeks, 
President Bush declared the end of major combat operations 
in Iraq.  Iraq’s leader was deposed and all authority had 
vanished.  The violence in Baghdad did not start 
immediately; first riots and looting commenced in the major 
cities.   
The pillaging caused irreparable damage to Iraq’s 
electrical producing sites.  Prior to the war, Iraq produced 
9,295 megawatts (MW) of electricity, while demand was 5,100 
MW.82  Following the invasion and widespread looting, 
electrical plants operated at a fraction of their pre-war 
levels, producing a meager 3,300 MW and thus were unable to 
meet the needs of the population. 83  The cascading affects 
of lack of electricity left areas without water, sanitation, 
and solid waste disposal systems, creating a growing health 
hazard.  The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) reported that one 
third of the children in the south and central provinces 
were suffering from malnutrition.  Only nine percent of 
rural areas outside Baghdad had operational sanitation, 
resulting in raw sewage being discharged into rivers and 
waterways.  Hospitals were looted during the early stages of 
the occupation as well.  Those who were now sick from 
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contaminated water or malnutrition could not receive 
treatment since many hospitals had closed and those still 
open lacked basic medicines.   
J. CONCLUSION 
As 2002 ended, U.S. patience with Iraq’s noncompliance 
with UN resolutions over the past twelve years had reached 
its limit.  Saddam had refused to comply with UN demands 
during the Iran-Iraq war.  When he refused to adhere to UN 
demands throughout the 1990s, the results were military 
action and sanctions that fractured the fabric of Iraqi 
society, decimating industry and destroying infrastructure.    
Due to a significant loss in electrical capability, public 
services did not operate at full capacity, resulting in 
backed-up sanitation systems and water contamination, which 
led, in turn, to an outbreak in disease.  Hospitals had been 
bombed, and those that survived were ill equipped to deal 
with the volume of humanitarian aid required as a result of 
the previous two decades.   
Immediately following the 2003 invasion, the UN and the 
World Bank undertook a joint mission to assess the situation 
in Iraq and lay the foundation for a reversal of the 





III. UNITED NATIONS ASSIST MISSION FOR IRAQ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1991, the United Nations Office of the High 
Council for Human Rights (OCHA) has catalogued the 
longstanding humanitarian crisis in Iraq. OCHA records 
highlight Iraqi physical abuse throughout Saddam’s 
Presidency.84  Once Saddam Hussein was deposed and combat 
operations in Iraq ended in May 2003, the United Nations 
took steps to reverse Iraq’s situation. With the full 
support of the international community, the UN adopted a 
series of resolutions to provide significant resources to 
reconstruct Iraq.  The resolutions emphasized the importance 
of affording Iraqis the right to freely determine their own 
political future and control their own natural resources.85   
This section will focus on several UN Security Council 
Resolutions that establish and outline the objectives of 
UNAMI, along with support documents that provide a clearer 
picture of the dynamics and growing relationship between 
UNAMI and support organizations. It will illustrate the 
maturation of the UNAMI, its organizational structure, the 
cluster approach to achieving adopted mandates, and the 
primary areas of focus within specified cluster areas.   
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B. BACKGROUND 
On May 22, 2003, the UN adopted UNSCR 1483, lifting 
thirteen years of sanctions imposed on Iraq and providing a 
framework that would later develop into the UNAMI (UNAMI).   
Table 1.  UNSCR 1483 
UNSCR 1483 Summary 
1-Lifts the sanctions burden on the Iraqi people. 
2-Encourages the international community to assist in helping the Iraqi  
people build a better future for their country. 
3-Establishes the position of a UN Special Representative who will play 
a vital role in all aspects of Iraq’s reconstruction. 
4-Winds down the O il-for-Food program (OFF) ov er a six- month period,  
while providing for the con tinued delivery of priority civilian good s 
approved and funded and Oil-for-Food to meet the immediate needs of the  
Iraqi people.  
5-Supports Iraqis in charting their own political and economic future.  
6-Reaffirms the Coalition’s commitment to work with the UN and an Iraqi 
Interim Administration to transition authority to an internationally 
recognized, representative government of Iraq as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.  86 
A select group of reconstruction experts in economics, 
government, and infrastructure from around the world 
traveled to Iraq to identify shortfalls and to propose 
options for reconstruction. 87  On July 15, 2003, recently 
appointed UN Special Representative to Iraq Sergio Vieira de 
Mello reported the group’s findings to the UN.  Noted 
problems included neglected maintenance on infrastructure 
and investment, buildings, pipelines, communication 
equipment and transportation links all damaged from years of 
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war. Other problems apart from those involving 
infrastructure were neglect of health and education systems, 
and environmental degradation caused by draining the 
southern marshes, which increased the threat to health, 
livelihood, and economic progress.  Significant 
contributions and commitment by the world community were 
required in order to reverse two decades of political and 
economic missteps by Iraq.88 
C. UNAMI ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
On August 14, 2003, the United Nations adopted UNSCR 
1500, thereby by establishing the UNAMI.  The resolution was 
modest in content, depending heavily on UNSCR 1483 as a 
strategy to support the specifics outlined in the Joint 
Needs Assessment (JNA).89   
On August 19, 2003, before significant work could begin 
to address Iraq’s humanitarian crisis and infrastructure 
woes, a bomb-laden cement truck exploded beside the UN 
headquarters building in Iraq, killing, Sergio Vieira de 
Mello and twenty-one others.90  The bombing caused the UN to 
withdraw from Iraq and operate from a headquarters in 
Jordan.  Even though Vieira de Mello was only at his post 
for a short time, he was instrumental in developing the JNA.  
The JNA was a combined project, funded by the United Nations 
Development Group and the World Bank (WB).  Staff members 
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from the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), UNDG, WB, and 
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) evaluated the 
results from the JNA to determine their role in each 
province of Iraq.  Security and oil were excluded from the 
priority list by request of the CPA.   
The JNA originally consisted of fourteen priority 
sectors and three cross-cutting themes applied as 
categorical checklists across the eighteen provinces of 
Iraq.91  In subsequent years, the fourteen sectors and 
cross-cutting themes would collapse to seven clusters as 
interdependence became obvious; for example, electricity and 
water were categorically placed under infrastructure 
rehabilitation.  Table 2 provides a codified list of the 
former fourteen priority sectors and cross-cutting themes; 
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Table 2.  14 UN Priority Sectors 
 14 Priority Sectors 2003 
Education: Primary, Secondary & Higher Education 
Health 
Agriculture & Water Resources 
Mine Action 




Transportation and Telecommunication 
Electricity 
Employment Housing & Land Management 
Urban Management 
Government Institutions, Civil Society, Rule of Law, Media 





Table 3.  UN Cluster Approach and Lead Agencies 
 
Cluster Approach 2008        Cluster Coordinators, UN Country 
Team, Iraq 
Agriculture, Food Security, 
Environment and Natural 
Resources Management 
Food and Agriculture Organization  
Education and Culture United Nations Children's Fund  
Governance and Human Development United Nations Development Program  
 36
Health and Nutrition World Health Organization  
Infrastructure Rehabilitation United Nations Children's Fund 
Refugees, Internally Displaced 
Persons and Durable Solutions 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 
Support to the Electoral Process United Nations Department of 
Political Affairs/Electoral 
Assistance Division 92 
The elements highlighted in Table 3 will be discussed 
at greater length in the next section, when Agriculture, 
Education, and Health will be assessed in the input-output 
model and human development indicator model in Chapter 4IV   
The JNA identified the immediate reconstruction needs 
for 2004 and medium term needs for 2005 through 2007.  The 
findings of the JNA were used to attract funding at a series 
of donor conferences.  The JNA provided the first written 
table of objectives that would eventually become the 
foundation for most reconstruction projects. 
The UNAMI formally commenced September 1, 2003.  The 
UNAMI originally consisted of sixteen primary UN agencies, 
two affiliated bodies, and two donor managers.  To date, the 
number of primary UN agencies has grown to twenty.  The 
twenty primary UN agencies supporting UNAMI are identified 
with cluster coordinators in Table 4.  The two affiliated 
bodies are the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and the World Bank (WB).  The IOM’s role is to address 
the increased transitory and internally displaced persons 
issue in Iraq since the spike in violence in 2004.  The WB’s 
mission is to “help Iraq build efficient, inclusive, 
transparent, and accountable institutions as needed for 
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stability, good governance, and sustainable economic 
prosperity.”93  The WB manages the International 
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) and United 
Nations Development Group Iraqi Transition Fund.  The IRFFI 
allows donors to provide funds with earmarks for a specific 
use or without earmarks for general-purpose use.  The ITF is 
a partnership with the World Bank that allows donors to fund 
their projects through a single channel, thereby reducing 
donor transaction costs.94  
                     
93
 World Bank Official Website, “Second World Bank Interim Strategy 
for Iraq,” (August, 2005). http://go.worldbank.org/7PNX0QMG00 (accessed 
August 13, 2008).  
94
 UN Assist Mission for Iraq Official Website, (2004-2008). 
http://www.uniraq.org/aboutus/unct.asp (accessed August 4, 2008).  
 38
Table 4.  Primary Agencies Operating with the UNAMI 
Primary United Nations Agencies Operating with UNAMI 
Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESCWA)  
United Nations Education, Science 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)  
United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA)  
International Labour Organization 
(ILO)  
United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) 
International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) 
United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF)  
Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR)  
United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO)  
United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN/DESA) 
United Nations Fund for Advancement 
of Women (UNIFEM)  
United Nations Department of 
Political Affairs/Electoral 
Assistance Division (UN DPA/EAD) 
United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) 
United Nations Centre for Human 
Settlements (UN-HABITAT) 
United Nations Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS) 
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP)  
World Food Program (WFP)  
United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP)  
World Health Organization (WHO) 95 
On October 23 and 24, 2003, the UN hosted a 
reconstruction conference in Madrid, Spain.  The goal of 
this initial conference was to build political support and 
secure pledges while linking reconstruction needs to 
humanitarian needs. 96  The JNA report requested $35.819 
billion; the international community confirmed its support 
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by pledging $33 billion in grants and loans.97  Since that 
initial conference, six additional donor conferences have 
been held in Tokyo, Japan (2004), at the Dead Sea, Jordan, 
(2005), Amman, Jordan, (2006), Istanbul, Turkey, Bari, Italy 
(2007), and Baghdad, Iraq (July 8, 2008).  The purpose of 
these subsequent donor conferences was to discuss the 
progress made between meetings and to envision future 
projects, while continually raising funds to continue 
reconstruction in Iraq.   
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As of October 2007, the GAO reported that international 
donors had pledged an additional $16.4 billion in grants for 
Iraq’s reconstruction.98  
D. UN MANDATES  
On June 8, 2004, the United Nations adopted UNSCR 1546,  
welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s 
transition to a democratically elected 
government, and looking forward to the end of the 
occupation and the assumption of full 
responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign 
and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 
June 2004.99   
The United Nations continued to position itself to play 
a major role in the reconstruction of Iraq; the specifics 
are outlined in Table 5.  UNSCR 1546 provided amplifying 
information as to the mission in Iraq that had been 
authorized by the initial mandate, UNSCR 1500. However, 
ambiguous language left the mission without a clear path to 
follow.  
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Table 5.  UNSCR Summary 
UNSCR 1546 Summary 
1-Assist in convening a nat ional conference in July 20 04 to sel ect a  
Consultative Council. 
2-Advise and support the In dependent Electoral Commission of Ir aq, as  
well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National 
Assembly, on the process for holding elections. 
3-Promote national dialogue and consensus building on the drafting of a 
national constitution by the people of Iraq. 
4-Advise the Government of Iraq o n the development of effective civil 
and social services.   
5-Contribute to t he coordination and delivery of re construction,
development, and humanitarian assistance.  
6-Promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and 
judicial and legal reform i n order t o strengthen the r ule of la w in 
Iraq.   
7-Advise and assist the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the  
eventual conduct of a comprehensive census. 
8-Multinational force shall have the authority to take  all nece ssary 
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in 
Iraq. The Iraqi re quest for continued presence of the  multinati onal 
force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring 
terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfill its role  
in assisting the Iraqi people.  
9-The mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at the 
request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this 
resolution. This mandate will be terminated earlier if requested by the 
Government of Iraq. 100 
 
A number of decisions important to the reconstruction 
of Iraq were delineated in UNSCR 1546.  This thesis will 
focus on points 5 and 6, which deal with the reconstruction 
and humanitarian assistance missions, and their maturation 
from 2004 to the present.  
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On August 10, 2007, the UN adopted UNSCR 1770, thereby 
expanding its role in Iraq and providing greater clarity to 
its mission there. UNSCR 1770 empowered the UN to utilize 
the infrastructure that had been developed since UNSCR 1546 
was adopted.  
UNSCR 1770 is broken down into three main parts. The 
first section centers on advising, supporting, and assisting 
Iraq to increase political dialogue and national 
reconciliation, summarily focusing on governance. Section 2 
seeks to promote, support, and facilitate human rights and 
social service development in coordination with the 
government of Iraq. Section 3 is brief but worth mentioning, 
because it is mutually supportive of section two through the 
promotion of “human rights and judicial and legal reform to 
improve the rule of law.” 101  The primary points of section 
2 are provided in Table 6.  
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Table 6.  UNSCR 1770 Summary 
UNSCR 1770 Summary 
1. The coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the 
safe, orderly, and voluntary return, as appropriate, of refugees and 
displaced persons. 
2. The implementation of the International Compact with Iraq, including 
coordination with donors and international financial institutions. 
3. The coordination and implementation of programs to improve Iraq’s 
capacity to provide essential services for its people and continue 
active donor coordination of critical reconstruction and assistance 
programs through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq 
(IRFFI). 
4. Economic reform, capacity building and the conditions for sustainable 
development, including through coordination with national and regional 
organizations and, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and 
international financial institutions. 
5. The development of effective civil, social and essential services, 
including through training and conferences in Iraq when possible. 
6. The contributions of UN agencies, funds, and programs to the 
objectives outlined in this resolution under a unified leadership of the 
Secretary-General through his Special Representative for Iraq. 102 
 
On August 8, 2008, the UN adopted Resolution 1830, 
which extended the mission in Iraq for twelve months. This 
is the most recent in a series of yearly extensions that 
have occurred since UNAMI began in 2003.  The expectations 
of greater progress in reconstruction in the coming year are 
optimistic due to the improved security situation and 
special attention from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.   
E. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ 
Secretary Ki-moon and the Iraqi government worked in 
tandem to complete the International Compact with Iraq in 
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May 2007.  Its purpose was to “establish a framework for 
Iraq to realize its National Vision.” 103  Iraq’s National 
Vision was outlined in twenty-two parts focusing on 
political, security, and socio-economics.  For brevity and 
applicability to this thesis, only general information is 
provided on the first nine parts of Iraq’s Nation Vision 
report, which dealt with political and security concerns.  
The crux of the report focuses on the socio-economic 
context. The National Vision for Iraq as outlined in the ICI 
can be summarized as follows:  
1. The political context consists of national dialogue 
and reconciliation, implementation of political and 
legislative timetables, and regional and international 
cooperation and integration.104  
2. The security context encompasses building up forces 
and security, assuming responsibilities and working with 
friends and allies, and disarming, disbanding, and re-
integrating militias.  The goals of human rights development 
are found in the security context;  
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these involve establishing a comprehensive human rights 
regime countrywide, establishing and implementing effective 
rule of law and institutions and policies, and establishing 
effective transitional justice mechanisms.105   
3. The socio-economic context is vast in nature, with 
specific interest in managing Iraq’s oil revenue and natural 
resources, developing agriculture and water management 
strategies, and developing policies for economic agility at 
the national and regional levels and promoting private 
sector development.  Additional measures include 
strengthening institutions and improving governance 
throughout civil service reform, and engaging civil society 
by implementing policy that will stimulate public 
participation.  Lastly, the ICI addresses human development 
and human security, citing that they, “are some of the main 
outcomes of the Compact and will serve as criteria for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the entire process.”106   
The ICI aligns its principal visions with those found 
in UNSCR 1546, the first document to define the role of 
UNAMI. But the ICI provides more than clarity; it provides 
hard objectives and associated benchmarks to measure 
progress. One example can be seen in the goal to improve 
adult literacy and school completion by 25 percent by 2011.  
To achieve this goal, Iraq agreed to increase its education 
budget from 3.5 percent to 5 percent of its GDP. 107  The 
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tangible characteristics of the ICI, which align with UN 
mandates, are important steps toward assuring mutual support 
of a common goal. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The UNAMI started as an ambitious mandate and increased 
over time.  The complexities of rebuilding Iraq were 
reflected in the architecture developed by the UN and World 
Bank in order to support the mission.  The assist mission 
included varying degrees of reconstruction, from basic life 
support services to industrial projects, making it arguably 
the most challenging reconstruction operation ever 
undertaken by the UN. In the wake of the U.S.-led invasion 
and removal of Saddam Hussein from office, the international 
community provided assistance by forgiving foreign debt and 
providing grants and loans as financial means to reconstruct 
Iraq.  The UN adopted mandates in 2004 and follow on 
mandates to the present in order to adapt to the conditions 
on the ground.  A solid foundation was created for the UNAMI 
to carry out a successful reconstruction campaign in Iraq.  
In order to conduct the mission effectively and efficiently 
the UN and government of Iraq together in partnership must 




IV. ASSESSING UNAMI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will discuss the progress the UNAMI has 
achieved over the past five year by reviewing three cluster 
areas with special emphasis on agriculture, education, and 
health.  The progress made in each element of the cluster 
areas will be measured by comparing stated objectives with 
what was accomplished.  Next, a series of human development 
indicators from 2000, before UNAMI, and 2007, after the 
mission was established and operating will be reviewed to 
identify progress in the stated objective areas. The human 
development indicators are life expectancy at birth, 
literacy rates, and GDP per capita.  By integrating and 
evaluating the applicable elements of the classic approach 
and human development indicators to UNAMI’s objectives and 
outcomes, one can examine whether or not the manner of 
measuring progress affects the results. 
B. PROGRESS 2003-2008 
The first UNAMI donor conference was held in Madrid, 
Spain, in October 2003, and the first donation was received 
in the ITF and IRFFI in early 2004.  In the spring of 2004, 
initial contracts were awarded and the reconstruction of 
Iraq commenced according to the prescription of the 2003 
JNA. Since that time, the IRFFI and ITF have funded nearly 
$821 million in reconstruction projects out of the $1.08 
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billion available.108  As of March 2008, 2155 contracts had 
been awarded to 47 different countries participating in the 
UNAMI.109   
A number of challenges in project implementation still 
remain, with security continuing to be the primary hindrance 
to reconstruction projects. Appreciation of the Iraqi Dinar, 
the weak banking system, and a lack of available goods have 
also contributed to the delay of many projects.  Other 
challenges include the lack of individual and institutional 
capacities to complete agreed-upon contracts in a timely 
manner.  Finally, the government of Iraq (GOI) was 
indecisive on the priority and scope of proposed projects; 
this led to delays and lost opportunities due to the 
unpredictable security situations.110   
The emphasis throughout this section is on the progress 
and setbacks in clusters “A,” “B,” and “D.”  
C. CLUSTER “A” - AGRICULTURE  
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead 
UN organization for cluster “A,” due to its vast experience 
in working with the UN in Iraq since the early 1990s. 111  
The FAO works on all aspects of agriculture for the UNAMI, 
including policy reform, capacity building, and investment 
programs. 
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Policy reforms are mechanisms to sustain agricultural 
development by defining the roles of the state and the 
private sector through decentralization, “emphasizing 
planning, programming and executing role of the local 
authorities.”112   The goal is to establish and reform 
policies that promote land and water management.  The 
policies focus on increasing distribution channels through 
marketing networks that align with WTO standards.  Another 
aspect of policy reform includes an assessment of rural 
financing policies and their ability to meet the needs of 
the agricultural sector. 
Capacity building seeks to improve agricultural 
institutions through “research, technology transfer, 
adaption, and extension in order to increase productivity 
and establish mechanisms for sustainability.” 113  Capacity 
building includes “building up of farmers’ groups, local 
associations” and “the development of traditional products 
for which Iraq has a comparative advantage.” 114  Finally, 
capacity development hinges on education in the agriculture 
sector to replace the effects of the brain drain caused by 
years of war.  The goal is to create enough capacity in the 
agriculture sector to enable it to become self sufficient 
and reduce Iraq’s dependence on food imports.   
Investment for agricultural development is extensive, 
and is the most tangible of the pillars.  Agricultural 
development consists of “rehabilitation of the irrigation 
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network, water quality monitoring and rehabilitation of 
drainage infrastructure, seed production to include cereals, 
vegetables, and potatoes.” 115  Other aspects include animal 
development, fresh and saltwater fishery development, and 
agro processing infrastructure for crops and livestock 
products which will provide processed products for urban 
markets.116 In other words, the goal is to treat crops with 
pesticides and fertilizer, and vaccinate livestock before it 
is sent to the market.  Additional aspects of agriculture 
include fertilizers, agro-chemicals, and marketing and 
distribution chains. 
1. Progress in Agriculture 
Since 2007, the improved security situation has 
afforded an opportunity for the UNAMI to make progress in 
agricultural development.  While not every project 
contracted for was completed, every pillar in agricultural 
development has made progress since May 2007.117   
In the policy pillar, dialogue was established with 
neighboring countries that share water resources from the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. 118  The goal was to bring 
positive inputs to the ongoing diplomatic negotiations among 
neighboring countries.  If regional actors can share water 
resources, over time, they may be able to expand their 
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economic ties and develop foreign policies based on common 
interests (similar to countries in the oil sector) rather 
than focus on their differences.   
In the capacity development pillar, a group of 300 
Iraqi water experts received advanced training in water 
resource management (WRM).  Following the advanced training, 
eighteen training courses and six workshops were organized 
and held in partnership with five Iraqi universities on a 
variety of WRM topics. 119  The 300 Iraqi experts were part 
of the collaborative effort; their participation gave them 
buy-in in the training of their countrymen. To further 
agricultural investment through capacity development, a 
feasibility study for irrigation schemes was completed that 
identified fourteen pumping stations requiring 
rehabilitation, fifty km of drainage canals requiring 
remodeling, and 115 km of irrigation canals requiring 
rehabilitation.120 The next phase in the water development 
initiative will be to identify or train experts for project 
implementation.  
In the agricultural investment pillar, increasing 
development capacity in agriculture will reduce dependency 
on foreign imports in the short and medium term.  A series 
of programs were implemented in livestock development to 
investigate, diagnose, and provide oversight to eradicate 
brucellosis disease. 121  To assist in this measure, one 
central and eighteen governorate laboratories were 
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established.122  Additional laboratories were established to 
increase livestock herds through artificial insemination; 
these facilities were staffed with personnel trained in 
embryonic transfer technology.  To date, 1,000 sheep and 200 
goats have lambed and kidded.   A “train the trainer” 
program was implemented to educate farmers on improved 
techniques for breeding and vaccinating cattle. Since the 
vaccination program was implemented, over “nine million 
heads of livestock have received immunization.”123  
In April 2007, government and private sector seed 
growers, breeders, and entrepreneurs gathered for the first 
national seeds workshop.  The meeting focused on formulating 
and reviewing legislation in order to adopt a policy that 
would allow for “sustainable seed development.” 124 A number 
of overseas study tours were undertaken by senior staff of 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) in order to increase their 
knowledge in a variety of areas, including seed policy, 
foreign regulations, laws, and quality control measures.  
Five senior fisheries officials have been trained.  
Procurement of equipment, fish feed and brood stock is in 
progress, while 1,500 fish pond owners have been supplied 
with fish fingerlings. As a result, fish production has 
increased to 4,000 kg/ha/year.125  
Agriculture is the one program out of the three 
analyzed that has some promise.  “Agriculture is Iraq’s 
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largest employer and second largest contributor to GDP, and 
an effective engine for promoting stability through private 
sector development, poverty reduction and food security.” 126  
The largest problem in agriculture, as with all UNAMI 
programs, is its inability to address short-term needs. 
Livestock and rice can be produced to meet the next season’s 
requirements, but not more immediate needs.    
D. CLUSTER “B” - EDUCATION 
Before the economic sanctions of the 1990s, the 
education system in Iraq was considered one of the best in 
the region. After years of neglect, however, the education 
system took a turn for the worse. Only one in six children 
had textbooks, teachers went unpaid, and looting stripped 
the schools of basic supplies. 127   The United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
has estimated that 6 million Iraqis are illiterate.  USAID 
and the Ministry of Education (MoE) have joined ranks to 
return the quality of education to the level of the 1980s.  
USAID assisted in refurbishing more than 3,000 schools as of 
2004,128 and more than 6,700 schools as of 2008. 129  The 
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United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) is the lead UN organization in Iraq for cluster “B” 
due to its experience over the past half decade as the 
champion for children’s education.  UNICEF has partnered 
with GOI to establish policy, build capacity for 
sustainability, and develop institutions to support the 
educational needs of Iraq.  UNICEF’s goals are to  
…enhanced access and quality of education at all 
levels starting with early childhood and 
progressing to the primary, secondary, 
technical/vocational and tertiary levels of 
education; increased participation of various 
national and intentional stakeholders and 
increased internal and external efficiency rates 
at all levels of education, particularly in 
vulnerable geographic areas and amongst neglected 
population groups.130  
The UNAMI seeks the following outcomes, which align 
with Iraq’s long term national goals: “to enhance access to 
all levels of education, with special reference to disparity 
reduction,” to “strengthen the institutional and human 
capacity of education,” and finally, to “enhance policy 
formulation and curriculum development.”131  
1. Progress in Education 
As in the agriculture cluster, progress in the 
education cluster can be separated into three distinct 
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categories: policy development, capacity initiatives, and 
education investment.  In policy development, a baseline 
early childhood development (ECD) survey was conducted in 
early 2008. 132  The purpose was to examine child-rearing 
practices in Iraq and develop policies that would promote an 
increased capacity for learning in the development 
trajectory of young children.133  
After years of rehabilitation of neglected school 
buildings and construction of new facilities, the focus has 
now shifted to equipping and supporting these facilities. 
UNESCO, working with the GoI Ministry of Education, has put 
forward three new programs with a cost of $11 million. The 
three programs focus on strengthening capacity by delivering 
primary, secondary, vocational, and advanced education. 134  
These programs will purchase new textbooks, provide training 
for educators, and construct an Education Information 
Management System (EMIS). 135  EMIS is used as a tracking 
tool to collect data on demographics, attendance, course 
information, etc. Ongoing projects include training teachers 
for sustained quality education, sending teachers abroad to  
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study secondary education, training for technical 
institutions, literacy, and basic life skills development 
projects.136  
The educational investment sector reported an increase 
in net enrollment for primary age children, from 79 percent 
in 2004 to 85.8 percent in 2008. 137  The secondary education 
enrollment level increased as well, from 36 percent in 2003 
to 40.1 percent in 2008.138 
E. CLUSTER “D” - HEALTH 
The World Health Organization (WHO) is the lead UN 
organization in Iraq for cluster “D,” due to its extensive 
experience in dealing with health crises throughout the 
world since 1948. 139  The Iraq National Health Care 
strategy, implemented in collaboration with the WHO and 
UNAMI, is to “[s]trengthen the national healthcare delivery 
system, and reorient it from being hospital-focused to being 
based on primary health care delivery,” and to “strengthen 
emergency preparedness and response in order to address the 
needs of Iraqis, especially vulnerable populations, while 
promoting a healthy living environment.” 140  The WHO 
supports the Iraq National Healthcare Strategy by working 
toward specific outcomes; these include “reducing infant, 
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under five, and maternal mortality,” while “[i]ncreasing 
access to quality health care services; enhanc[ing] 
emergency preparedness and response, disease prevention and 
control;” as well as “enhancing healthy living environment 
and promotion of healthful lifestyles.” 141  In order to make 
progress in those areas, a number of incremental steps have 
been taken to lay the foundation for sustainable health 
care.  
In 2006, a family health survey was conducted to 
identify daily habits that may impact an Iraqi’s health. 
Categories surveyed were nutrition, vaccination, health care 
availability, and tobacco use, among others. 142  From that 
report, a series of policy changes occurred through the 
development of legislation to improve health and nutrition.  
The legislation also included a basic health services 
package to fund the rehabilitation and equipage of Primary 
Health Care facilities PHCs.143  
Iraq’s capacity development continues to grow, with 
training in health care leading the charge.  The PHC 
training manual has been finalized and adopted, and will be 
used to educate PHC providers in standard practices. 144  As 
of this writing, ten nurse training centers, nineteen PHC 
training centers, and twenty-five continuing education 
centers at teaching hospitals have been established. 145  
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Nearly 15,000 Iraqis have been trained in different sectors 
to increase the staffing capacity in PHC, health economics, 
and nursing. The Ministry of Health (MoH) invested in the 
training of over 600 medical staff in maternal and child 
health and PHC services. 146  Other significant education and 
training events that occurred since the May 2007 UN report 
to donors included “twelve two days National workshops for 
180 health professionals including physicians, 
refractionists, and nurses in the area of blindness and 
primary eye care.” 147   Additional capacity development 
initiatives included “19 National workshops on the 
integration of non-communicable diseases into primary health 
care with 475 PHC doctors and nurses in attendance.” 148  The 
adoption of policy in tandem with capacity building measures 
in rehabilitating PHCs and training health care providers, 
created opportunities for development in healthcare 
investment in a number of areas.  
Specific accomplishments resulting from healthcare 
investment included significant reductions in cases of 
polio, measles, and malaria, and the near-eradication of 
cholera, which had been widespread prior to 2004. 149  In 
September and October 2007, “Polio National Immunization 
days were held, reaching 4.6 million children under five 
years of age,”150 or roughly 96 percent of the target group.  
For the first time since 2003, the MoH procured sufficient 
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vaccines to immunize 100 percent of its population against 
MMR and 80 percent against polio, highlighting its 
commitment to its population’s health.151  
F. THE UNAMI SHORTFALLS 
A considerable amount of work and progress has been 
made in the highlighted cluster areas; however, progress has 
often been overshadowed by the volatile security situation 
hindering reconstruction projects.  As discussed above, 
appreciation of the Iraqi Dinar, a weak banking system, 
shortages of required goods, a lack of both individual and 
institutional capacity, and GOI indecisiveness on the 
priority and scope of proposed projects, all provided 
challenges to implementation. 152  “Agencies indicated in 
October 2007 that project implementation often required an 
additional 12 to 24 months beyond the original end date to 
achieve 100 percent implementation.” 153 The delays in 
decision-making by government institutions were the result 
of several layers of bureaucracy coupled with “frequent 
changes in personnel within agencies.” 154  The MoH and MoE 
failed to cooperate or reach an agreement on a number of 
elements within projects, such as committee positions, scope 
of work, and time of completion, resulting in gridlock in 
capacity development.155  
The security situation hampered the operations.  
Projects could not be completed on time due to delays in 
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supply delivery, which resulted in warehouse overload.  This 
had a cascading effect on the distribution system; 
additional supplies could not be ordered until the supplies 
on hand were delivered. 156  Once projects were completed, 
they could not be adequately verified due to lack of safe 
transportation; this often resulted in poor workmanship.  
The security situation also increased project costs since 
meetings and training were moved to a safe zone in 
Jordan.157  
Finally, the delays in determining the scope of work, 
the problems with supply delivery, and the dangerous working 
conditions made it difficult to recruit and maintain senior 
UN staff to complete complex projects. 158  Iraq simply lacks 
the internal technical expertise to complete large scale 
projects in any of the cluster areas highlighted. As a 
result, Iraq is dependent on outside expertise for the short 
and medium term.   
G. ASSESSMENT 
Taking into account the progress and shortfalls 
highlighted and comparing them to UNSCR 1548 and 1770, Table 
7 assesses effectiveness and efficiency in each of the three 
cluster areas.  Efficiency and effectiveness are defined as 
the most efficient use of resources and the ability to 
actually achieve stated goals, respectively.  In the 
agriculture, education, and health clusters, the UNAMI is 
assessed as partially effective because the mission is 
making progress.  Progress may not be at the expected level, 
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but the mission is progressing.  The mission is assessed as 
ineffective due to the delays in projects and the continual 
rise in their costs as a result of fluctuations in the value 
of the Iraqi dinar together with the list of shortfalls 
previously addressed.   
Table 7.  Stated Objectives V. Accomplishments 
 
The second metric applied is the HDI approach. HDIs are 
life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and GDP per 
capita. The degree of change from 2000 to 2007, roughly four 
years after the UNAMI commenced, indicates a negligible 
difference in each category. The most significant variance 
between the two data sources was in adult literacy; however, 
since the sample size for each source was unavailable, the 
large disparity cannot be explained.  This speaks to one of 
the core issues with the UN: its lack of transparency and 
consistent reporting.  In Table 8, the data from multiple 
sources are averaged since reliable and consistent data 
could not be retrieved, with the exception of the GDP per 
capita category.    
Topic           Effective Efficient 
Agriculture Partial No 
Education Partial No 
Health Partial No 
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Table 8.  Human Development Indicators for Iraq 























$2700 (b)    $3600 (b)  159
 
The United Nations Development Program adopted the HDI 
index as a tool to measure human development.  The data 
needed to evaluate the progress achieved in each cluster 
area were not available through the lead agency reports.  
The data were found on a number of websites; they were 
relatively consistent but still have a range large enough to 
create credibility issues.  After the data were reviewed and 
the most credible information was chosen, the results 
indicated incremental progress in GDP per capita and a 
reduction in life expectancy, with literacy rates holding 
constant. 
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It appears that the $1.08 billion contracted through 
the UNDG/ITF and IRFFI did very little to improve human 
development in Iraq.  The original criticism by Anthony 
Cordesman, in a 2007 report for the Center for Strategic 
International Studies (CSIS), asserting that the UNAMI 
quantifies progress in dollars spent rather than objectives 
achieved, appears to be true.   
H. CONCLUSION 
A careful review of the policy, capacity, and 
investment development side of each cluster area has 
highlighted a significant amount of work done by and 
progress made by the UNAMI.  The original mandate, UNSCR 
1546, called for progress in the political and economic 
areas of reconstruction.  In UNSCR 1770, the focus was to 
“implement programs to increase Iraq’s capacity to provide 
essential services to the population.” 160  Unfortunately, 
the UNAMI has incrementally progressed, but lacks 
efficiency.  Therefore, the UNAMI can only be assessed as 
partially effective in achieving the stated objectives.  The 
HDI assessment demonstrates regression in two of the three 
HDIs.  This clearly shows that the UNAMI has not been 
effective in these areas.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
What is clear is that the UNAMI lacks efficiency in 
policy, capacity, and investment development, making 
effective progress unachievable.  The primary reasons why 
the UNAMI is inefficient are due to a lack of oversight, 
weak indicators of progress, its goals and means misaligned, 
a lack of interagency cooperation, and poor buy-in from 
international partners and the Iraqis themselves.  From the 
UNAMI experience, with emphasis on agriculture, education, 
and health clusters, I have made the following 
recommendations.   
Oversight on the UNAMI spending must be improved to 
eliminate abuses and waste.  For example, Parsons Corps was 
awarded the contract to build 142 primary health care 
facilities.  After completing just twenty PHCs, they walked 
away from the contract and kept the $200 million. 161  The 
contracts have been re-awarded to Iraqis as part of a self-
reliance initiative. The upside is Iraqis are rebuilding 
Iraq, the downside is US$200 million gone and additional 
funds are required to pay for the remaining PHCs.  A series 
of steps could increase oversight to ensure that this does 
not occur in the future. In order to make oversight 
proactive instead of reactive, oversight committees should 
periodically inspect projects and validate progress.  If 
benchmarks are not being met, other reliable contractors 
should be used to complete the job in a timely manner.  In 
other words, every project should have a set of benchmarks 
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to help the project along and force objective oversight.  
The validation of progress and authorization of additional 
funds should be coordinated through a command and control 
element in charge of security.  Other options include an 
innovative recommendation by Carlos Pascual to get rid of 
account structures and “create incentives for the 
interagency [groups] to come together.” 162  His point was 
that there are too many individual accounts within each 
organization - the UN included, this leads to 
ineffectiveness that focuses on dollars spent rather than an 
indication of progress.  
The UNAMI must have firm and clear indicators of 
progress for every program it administers to ensure the 
maximum utility of every dollar spent.  Determining what to 
measure is the most difficult when deciding how to measure 
progress. As indicated, the UN only provides completion 
numbers to indicate progress. For example, the UN indicated 
total number of schools rehabilitated or animals vaccinated 
but failed to provide the baseline. How many schools require 
rehabilitation?  Is the objective to rehabilitate every 
school?  What does vaccinating 4.9 million livestock do for 
the objective?  If there are 20 million heads of livestock 
this number is mediocre, if there are 5 million heads of 
livestock this number is exceptional.  Indicators of 
progress should include; beginning strength - how many 
widgets are working now, end strength - how many widgets  
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will work when complete, and essential tasks that must be 
completed to incrementally measure progress with clear 
indicators.  
To achieve the level of effectiveness and efficiency 
defined by civil military relations scholar Thomas Bruneau, 
they need to come into alignment with one another.  This is 
especially true in complex operations with multiple 
principal-agent relationships, as found in the UN.  To 
foster effectiveness and efficiency a system of measurements 
and indicators should be developed to encourage progress 
that supports domestic and international goals.  Currently, 
a metric does not exist to determine the progress of UN PSO.  
A number of reports continually reinforce the fact that they 
are unable to determine if the UNAMI is progressing 
effectively due to the lack of an ability to measure its 
performance.  The GAO stated, “Inadequate performance data 
and measures make it difficult to determine the overall 
progress and impact” of reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 163   
Domestic and international goals must be aligned and 
supported with resources.  Resources include money, 
international community support, troops on the ground, and 
time to see the mission to completion. 164  Troops and a 
“workable political settlement” in tandem are necessary 
conditions for successful reconstruction. 165  One without 
the other will not work.  For example, in 2003, the UNAMI 
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mandate was adopted; however, two years passed before the 
ICI and Iraq’s National Strategy proposed its goals and 
aligned with the UNAMI, further delaying progress.   
An optimistic view of capabilities is essential.  When 
the UNAMI was adopted the UN did not have the capability to 
address the complex issues facing Iraq.  Ambassador Dobbins 
characterized the early reconstruction efforts in Iraq as 
“amateur hour that created a good deal of early confusion 
and setbacks which have made it so difficult to make 
meaningful progress.” 166  Over time the capabilities to 
address some of the issues have been developed, but more to 
the point, the capability to conduct reconstruction 
operations at the magnitude required in Iraq still does not 
exist.   
The UNAMI also needs to work better with the other 
international agencies, both within and external to the UN. 
A revolving theme is solving the interagency issue to allow 
resource sharing to multiply capabilities.  General David 
Barno, an Afghan expert concluded, “unity of effort between 
the civilian component and our operation and the military 
components needed some degree of strengthening.” 167  
Indicating that planning is priority for the military and 
conducted before human resources are deployed while civilian 
response forces deploy without prior planning and adjust to 
the day to day needs of the operation.  By effectively 
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fusing the military planning and operational capacity with 
the unique skill sets civilian response teams provide the 
results would increase effectiveness in the UNAMI.  
Finally, for the reconstruction mission to succeed the 
Iraqis themselves must take an invested interest approach. 
It is understood that decades of repression have created a 
society of indecisiveness.  However, Saddam Hussein has been 
deposed for four years and the country has made marginal 
progress in its evolution to legitimate statehood.  Each 
recommendation for change can be implemented but without 
Iraqis rebuilding Iraq, reconstruction efforts are futile.  
In the past year the true successes in reconstruction and 
building a better Iraq have come from grass roots 
initiatives in which community groups have access to funds 
for projects.  By continually empowering the masses at the 
local and provincial levels, the national government can 
focus on regional partnerships to foster regional stability 
and put an end to the cycle of violence that has plagued 
Iraq.  
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